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Abstract 
Multisourcing has become a common sourcing model in recent outsourcing practice. Yet, 
the extant and relevant IS literature has so far offered limited insight into how to stipulate 
both individual (i.e., individual vendor) and joint (the entire vendor network) perfor-
mance while ensuring governance efficiency. Our study set about addressing this gap by 
examining how these three dimensions of multisourcing success can be achieved through 
formal governance. Specifically, we considered bilateral formal control, collective formal 
control and conflict arbitration (among vendors) as key formal governance elements. Re-
sults from a pan-European survey of client firms pursuing multisourcing projects show 
that bilateral formal control sets the stage to achieve both individual and joint perfor-
mance, while conflict arbitration strengthens individual performance, and collective for-
mal control strengthens joint performance. Governance efficiency is improved when both 
collective formal control and conflict arbitration are high. We also found that conflict ar-
bitration strengthens the positive effect of collective formal control on both individual and 
joint performance. Our findings highlight the importance of governing inter-vendor re-
lationships in multisourcing arrangements as opposed to relying solely on bilateral gov-
ernance. Our study extends the limited literature on IS multisourcing, and assists man-
agers in considering the strategies they wish to pursue when choosing appropriate gov-
ernance mechanisms.  
Keywords:  Multisourcing, formal governance, collective governance, bilateral govern-
ance, conflict arbitration, multisourcing success, joint performance, governance efficiency 
 
Introduction 
Outsourcing practitioners and researchers alike are paying increasing attention to information systems (IS) 
multisourcing—the practice of contracting interdependent IS services to two or more vendors (Bapna et al. 
2010; Wiener and Saunders 2014). Unlike multi-vendor outsourcing (Angst et al. 2017; Koo et al. 2016; 
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Levina and Su 2008; Su and Levina 2011), where multiple vendors are contracted to provide different in-
dependent services, multisourcing requires vendors to interact due to interdependencies between the ser-
vices each of them delivers as part of a larger integrated service to a client  (Bapna et al. 2010). Given these 
interdependencies, clients pursue at least three objectives in multisourcing. First, clients need to ensure 
that each vendor, individually, delivers its respective service to the client’s satisfaction (individual perfor-
mance). Second, clients need to ensure that the overall larger service meets their expectations, which im-
plies that interdependencies and conflicts between vendors are effectively addressed (joint performance). 
Third, despite the complexity inherent to the management of interdependencies among multiple vendors, 
clients may also want to keep their governance efforts within reasonable limits (governance efficiency). In 
this paper, we examine the formal governance strategies clients can use to achieve these objectives. 
Although the existing outsourcing and control literatures provide useful foundations for investigating the 
relationship between formal governance and success in outsourcing, we note three important gaps in the 
context of multisourcing. First, while the literature focuses on success in dyadic outsourcing relationships 
(Gopal and Gosain 2010; Tiwana and Keil 2009), multisourcing arrangements present a more complex set-
ting in which both dyadic relationships (between the client and each vendor) and collective relationships 
(between the client and the set of vendors) exist (see also Figure 1). In such a setting, clients exercise gov-
ernance to not only ensure high individual performance from each vendor, but also to achieve high levels 
of joint performance (implying that the individual services integrate smoothly into a coherent whole) and 
governance efficiency. However, there is little empirical research that focuses on these three distinct dimen-
sions of multisourcing success. Second, while the existing literature examines the role of formal control 
(i.e., the client’s efforts to formally specify and monitor outcomes and procedures) (Choudhury and 
Sabherwal 2003; Rustagi et al. 2008), formal control can be of two different types in multisourcing: bilat-
eral formal control and collective formal control. In bilateral formal control, clients specify and monitor 
outcomes to be achieved and procedures to be followed by each vendor individually. In contrast, in collec-
tive formal control, the client specifies and monitors the outcomes to be jointly achieved and procedures to 
be jointly followed by the vendors. Although Bapna et al. (2010) introduce this distinction, there is little 
empirical evidence that shows how these two types of formal governance, and their interaction, affect suc-
cess. Third, multisourcing has been portrayed as potentially leading to a blame-game between vendors 
(Bapna et al. 2010). Thus, conflict resolution between vendors is imperative to achieving desired outcomes. 
Given this unique threat of between-vendor conflict in multisourcing, Bapna et al. (2010) suggest that con-
flict arbitration procedures (often specified through operational-level agreements) can help vendors re-
solve conflicts themselves.  Yet empirical research on the effect of between-vendor conflict arbitration char-
ters on multisourcing success is lacking.  
In the light of these gaps, our research aims to address the following question: How do bilateral formal 
control, collective formal control, and conflict arbitration affect success in multisourcing arrangements?  
To address this question, we develop a conceptual model that distinguishes between the two levels on which 
interactions take place in multisourcing settings: the dyadic client-vendor level and the triadic client-ven-
dors level, as shown in Figure 1. We develop hypotheses and test them using survey data from 189 multi-
sourcing arrangements. The results provide novel insights into how formal governance strategies and the 
interactions between them affect different dimensions of success in multisourcing arrangements. 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Multisourcing: background 
The key characteristic that distinguishes multisourcing arrangements from other settings that involve mul-
tiple vendors is the existence of interdependencies between services provided by different vendors (Bapna 
et al. 2010; Wiener and Saunders 2014). For instance, a major logistics service provider delegated the de-
velopment of state-of-the-art software for its letter carriers’ mobile devices to a team of six vendors. While 
each of the vendors developed a set of modules for the software, it was essential that the modules fitted 
together to form an integrated, coherent software application. To deal with these interdependencies, the 
client urged the vendors to help each other, to exchange information on a regular basis, and to accommo-
date unforeseen changes (Hurni et al. 2015; Tomczak 2015).  
Although multisourcing arrangements, as in the above example, involve multiple vendors and rely on col-
laboration between vendors, the arrangements are based on a set of dyadic contracts between the client and 
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each individual vendor. Figure 1 illustrates this by showing a multisourcing arrangement that involves two 
vendors. The arrangement encompasses two dyadic relationships, c-vA and c-vB, where each relationship 
is based on a separate contract. However, reducing the arrangement to these two dyads would create an 
incomplete representation of multisourcing by overlooking the interdependencies between the services pro-
vided by Vendor A and Vendor B. These interdependencies come into the picture only if the arrangement 
is conceptualized as a triad that involves the Client, Vendor A, and Vendor B. Multisourcing arrangements 
present a multi-level phenomenon (Klein and Kozlowski 2000), where the multisourcing arrangement 
(such as the triad in Figure 1) is at the higher level of analysis (level 2) and the client-vendor dyads that are 
part of the multisourcing arrangement are at the lower level of analysis (level 1). 
Acknowledging the multi-level nature of multisourcing is important for at least two reasons. First, clients 
make formal governance decisions both at the level of the dyad and at the level of the multisourcing ar-
rangement. Second, success may be measured on both these levels. We next elaborate on clients’ formal 
governance choices and on success dimensions at these two levels. 
 
Figure 1. Multisourcing Arrangement: Dyadic and Triadic Relationships  
 
Formal governance in multisourcing  
In line with the outsourcing and control literatures, we use the term formal governance to refer to the 
client’s use of document-based mechanisms to regulate the behavior of vendors (Goo et al. 2009; Poppo 
and Zenger 2002). Formal governance contrasts with relational governance, which denotes governance 
based on shared norms that result from social processes (Poppo and Zenger 2002). In this paper, we focus 
on formal governance. Although relational governance in multisourcing may also merit attention, formal 
governance is of particular importance, given that “relational governance … models might not be feasible 
for multiple vendors” (Bapna et al. 2010, p. 789). 
While most IS research on outsourcing governance refers to single-sourcing arrangements, Bapna et al. 
(2010) sketch three forms of formal governance in multisourcing, which we refer to as bilateral formal con-
trol, collective formal control, and conflict arbitration (see also the left-hand side of our research model in 
Figure 2). Following the control literature, we use the term formal control to refer to the extent to which a 
client attempts to regulate vendor behavior by specifying and monitoring procedures or outcomes (Keil et 
al. 2013; Kirsch 1996; Rustagi et al. 2008). According to Bapna et al. (2010), an important peculiarity of 
multisourcing arrangements is that clients have a choice between bilateral and collective formal control. In 
bilateral formal control, the client specifies and monitors outcomes to be achieved and procedures to be 
followed by each vendor individually. In contrast, in collective formal control,  the client specifies and mon-
itors the outcomes to be jointly achieved and procedures to be jointly followed by the vendors. 
To illustrate the difference between bilateral and collective formal control, consider the multisourcing pro-
ject of the logistics service provider mentioned above. Recall that the project involved the development of 
several application modules by different vendors. In this project, the client could specify and test outcomes 
related to a single module, such as what output data the module should produce based on choice of input 
data, or by when the development of the module should be completed. Moreover, the client could prescribe 
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particular development, test, or documentation procedures for the module. Since these examples refer to 
outcomes and procedures relevant to a particular vendor, they are instances of bilateral formal control. The 
client could also specify and test the end-to-end business process enabled by the collective of modules, or 
response times that resulted from the interaction of modules assigned to different vendors. Moreover, the 
client could specify that code contributions by individual vendors be integrated into a shared code system 
and jointly deployed several times a day (Humble and Molesky 2011). These latter two examples are in-
stances of collective formal control, since they refer to joint procedures (procedures that all vendors take 
part in) and joint outcomes (outcomes to be jointly produced by the vendors). The examples also illustrate 
that bilateral formal control may vary for different dyads within a multisourcing arrangement, whereas 
collective formal control does not. A client may tightly specify and monitor the outcomes of vendor A but 
not of vendor B (different levels of bilateral formal control for each dyad), while the extent to which the 
client specifies and monitors joint outcomes and procedures is a property of the multisourcing arrange-
ment.  
Bapna et al. (2010) also allude to a third type of formal governance in multisourcing. Clients may define 
operational-level agreements (OLAs) that specify how vendors sort out conflict between them, a mechanism 
that others have termed a conflict arbitration charter (Goo et al. 2009) (henceforth in brief: conflict arbi-
tration). Conflict arbitration carries the attractive promise that vendors can resolve conflict themselves, 
without the client’s involvement (Bapna et al. 2010). Since conflict arbitration refers to the interaction be-
tween vendors, it is a property of multisourcing arrangements, rather than of a particular client-vendor 
dyad. 
Multisourcing success 
The vast majority of IS outsourcing studies have examined success in a dyadic relationship with a single 
vendor. Indicators of success, examined from the client firm’s perspective, highlight the financial perfor-
mance of the client firm (Wang et al. 1997), improved service levels (Dibbern et al. 2004), and the quality 
of the relationship with the vendor (Grover et al. 1996). These studies focus on what we term individual 
performance, i.e., the degree to which the services rendered by an individual vendor meet the client’s ex-
pectations. Individual performance is a property of the client-vendor dyad. 
Contrary to a dyadic setting, the multisourcing setting requires interaction between the vendors in order to 
accommodate interdependencies between services outsourced to different vendors (Wiener and Saunders 
2014). To resolve interdependencies, vendors need to coordinate their actions and/or information to ensure 
that their interdependent services can be successfully integrated in a coherent whole IT service for their 
client. Therefore, high levels of individual performance by each vendor are not sufficient to guarantee a high 
level of joint performance, i.e., the degree to which the combined performance of interdependent vendors 
meets the client’s expectations, including costs savings, and provides satisfaction (Grover et al. 1996; Lee 
and Kim 1999; Tiwana 2008). For instance, in a multi-module software development project, vendor A may 
deliver software module A as per the contract (high individual performance) but fail to help vendor B, who 
is supposed to develop module B, which depends on the functionality of module A. Although vendor B also 
fulfills all contractual obligations (high individual performance), the client is unable to perform the end-to-
end business process because module B does not integrate well with module A (low joint performance). 
Achieving high joint performance is particularly demanding, because outsourcing contracts are signed with 
each vendor individually and there is no legally binding document that allows the client to legally enforce a 
particular level of joint performance. 
A third important dimension of success is governance efficiency, i.e., the degree to which coordinating, 
guiding, and monitoring interdependent vendors is free of effort for the client (Dibbern et al. 2012). Even 
in single-sourcing relationships, the client’s unplanned efforts in governing vendors may often exceed the 
cost savings expected from outsourcing (Dibbern et al. 2008). In multisourcing, governance efforts may 
further increase, due to the time needed to interact with multiple vendors and the coordination demands 
and opportunistic threats that result from interdependencies (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Dekker 2004). 
Hence, governance efficiency is a primary challenge in multisourcing. Since governance efficiency includes 
efforts for inter-vendor coordination, it is a property of multisourcing arrangements, rather than client-
vendor dyads. 
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Development of hypotheses  
Figure 2 depicts our research model. The model includes five hypothesized relationships between the three 
types of formal governance (bilateral formal control, collective formal control, and conflict arbitration) and 
three dimensions of multisourcing success (individual performance, joint performance, governance effi-
ciency). Two constructs, bilateral and formal control, are at the level of the client-vendor dyad (level 1), 
while the remaining four constructs are at the level of the multisourcing arrangement (level 2). 
 
Figure 2. Research Model 
 
Bilateral formal control: A bilateral formal control is a legally binding agreement between the client 
and the vendor that captures a dyadic dimension in the multisourcing setting. The specification of expected 
procedures and expected outcomes against prespecified performance benchmarks provides clear guidance 
to the vendor on how the client firm will evaluate the performance of an individual vendor. High levels of 
bilateral control may enhance individual performance by conveying useful knowledge about expected out-
comes and effective procedures that lead to these outcomes (Henderson and Lee 1992; Krancher and 
Slaughter 2013). Moreover, given their contractual foundation and their explicit focus on contributions by 
a particular vendor, bilateral formal controls are likely to be a particularly strong tool for discouraging op-
portunistic vendor behavior (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Dekker 2004; Tiwana and Keil 2009), which may 
further raise individual performance levels. High levels of bilateral control may also raise joint performance. 
Bilateral formal controls require clients to anticipate interdependencies at the outset of projects and define 
the outcomes and procedures for each vendor in a way that effectively addresses interdependencies. For 
instance, clear specification of the inputs and outputs of individual software modules to be developed by 
individual vendors (a type of bilateral formal control) may be critical for the later smooth integration of the 
modules into an overall coherent software system. This is in line with the control literature, which suggests 
that formal control can help achieve coordination (Nidumolu and Subramani 2003). High amounts of bi-
lateral formal control may also have positive effects on governance efficiency. As suggested by contingency 
theory (Van de Ven et al. 1976), prespecifying goals and procedures for each vendor, and ensuring adher-
ence to them, is likely to require lower governance efforts than the ongoing mutual adjustments across 
multiple organizational boundaries required in the absence of strong bilateral formal control. The expecta-
tion that bilateral formal control enhances governance efficiency is also in line with findings in the control 
literature on efficiency gains associated with the use of formal control (Gopal and Gosain 2010). We there-
fore posit:  
H1: Higher amounts of bilateral formal control are associated with higher multisourcing success. 
Collective formal control: In addition to prescribing prespecified benchmarks for each individual ven-
dor, clients may also specify and monitor the way vendors are expected to collaborate with each other 
(Wiener and Saunders 2014), and the outcomes that vendors are expected to jointly achieve. Such mecha-
nisms fall under the realm of collective formal control. Collective formal control is likely to be particularly 
effective for achieving coordination among vendors and, thus, high joint performance. When clients specify 
and monitor joint procedures, such as frequent code integration and deployment, they are urging vendors 
to interact,  share information, and help each other. This may help address interdependencies. Moreover, 
when clients specify and monitor joint outcomes, such as by specifying the end-to-end business process 
that the software under development should enable, they are directing the vendors’ attention to the overall 
Level 1:
Client-Vendor Dyad
Level 2:
Multisourcing
Arrangement
Multisourcing SuccessFormal Governance
Bilateral 
Formal Control
Collective 
Formal Control
Conflict
Arbitration
H1 (+)
Individual 
Performance
Joint 
Performance
Governance
Efficiency
H2 (+)
H3 (-)
H4 (+)H5 (+)
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picture, and helping to sensitize them for interdependencies. This is in line with the idea that control in-
volving many parties results in collective sensemaking and improved coordination among these parties 
(Kirsch 2004). Although, given its nature, collective formal control is particularly likely to increase joint 
performance, it may also have beneficial effects on individual performance and governance efficiency. Col-
lective formal control grants vendors some discretion in the way they create their individual contributions, 
as long as these individual contributions integrate well with the contributions of other vendors. This may 
allow knowledgeable vendors to bring to bear their expertise (Tiwana and Keil 2009), resulting in high 
individual performance. Collective control may also be a particularly efficient way for clients to manage 
multisourcing arrangements because this form of control does not involve efforts related to each invidual 
vendor. We therefore argue: 
H2: Higher amounts of collective formal control are associated with higher multisourcing success. 
Interaction of bilateral and collective formal control: A key tenet of the literatures on governance 
and control is that mechanisms often do not act in isolation, but rather complement or substitute each other 
(Poppo and Zenger 2002; Huber et al. 2014). Mechanism A complements (substitutes) mechanism B if the 
benefits from mechanism A increase (decrease) when mechanism B is used. We expect bilateral and collec-
tive formal control to substitute each other for three reasons. First, they are, at least in part, functional 
equivalents  (Huber et al. 2014), meaning that both controls serve the same functions of guiding and coor-
dinating vendors while discouraging opportunism. For instance, if strong bilateral formal control is in place, 
the need for strong collective formal control should be reduced. In other words, bilateral and collective 
formal control are to some extent substituting each other, implying clients may typically choose either one 
or the other. Second, bilateral formal control may undermine the strength of collective formal control. Col-
lective formal control grants vendors discretion in how they create their individual contributions, whereas 
bilateral formal control eliminates this discretion and prevents vendors from bringing their own expertise 
to bear. Third, collective formal control may undermine the strength of bilateral formal control. While bi-
lateral formal control offers the strength of being relatively easily enforceable, backed as it is by dyadic 
contracts, its power may be reduced in situations where bilateral and collective controls contradict each 
other. In such situations, vendors may opportunistically choose to comply with the control that promises 
the greater gain for themselves, in the belief that the client’s will cannot be enforced because of the ambi-
guities caused by contradictory controls. We therefore anticipate:  
H3: The positive association between collective formal control and multisourcing success is weaker when 
bilateral formal control is strong. 
Conflict arbitration: Multisourcing settings may lead to opportunistic behavior by vendors (Wiener and 
Saunders 2014). In particular, a high degree of performance ambiguity is likely to encourage ‘blame-games’ 
between vendors (Bapna et al. 2010).  It is therefore in the client’s interest to clarify and govern conflict 
arbitration between the vendors, beyond the client-vendor arbitration procedure commonly used in out-
sourcing settings. A common approach to clarifying and governing conflict arbitration is the use of OLAs. 
These outline the collaboration principles between vendors (Bapna et al. 2010). We expect conflict arbitra-
tion to have positive effects on individual performance, collective performance, and governance efficiency. 
Conflict arbitration can enhance individual performance and governance efficiency because it gives vendors 
a tool to enforce particular behaviors or outcomes from other vendors, without the involvement of the client 
(Bapna et al. 2010). For instance, if vendor A does not deliver its individual service, vendor B, who depends 
on vendor A’s contributions, may leverage the conflict arbitration charter to legitimize its efforts to put 
pressure on vendor A. As a result, the performance of vendor A may increase without the involvement of 
the client, which suggests high governance efficiency. Conflict arbitration may also enhance joint perfor-
mance. In cases where cognitive conflicts prevent vendors from effectively addressing interdependencies 
(Conner and Prahalad 1996; De Dreu and West 2001), conflict arbitration may help promote constructive 
interaction among vendors to find solutions. As such:  
H4: Higher amounts of conflict arbitration are associated with higher multisourcing success. 
Collective formal control and conflict arbitration: Following Bapna et al. (2010), we expect that 
formal control and conflict arbitration complement each other. Collective formal control is imperative for 
ensuring the delivery of an integrated service, as it decreases the risks involved in ignoring interdependen-
cies. However, as collective formal controls are not legally binding mechanisms, vendors are likely to shirk 
complying with such guidelines, assuming that they are unlikely to be penalized. Indeed, as multisourcing 
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is often described as presenting a high degree of performance ambiguity and task interdependency, a ven-
dor may not be penalized by the client and other vendors may not point out the source of a failure as they 
do not feel legitimized to do so (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Bapna et al. 2010). Conflict arbitration, partic-
ularly in the form of OLAs, legitimizes such inter-vendor management efforts, supporting vendors in their 
endeavors to enforce the contributions needed from other vendors to achieve joint outcomes. We therefore 
posit:    
H5: The positive association between collective formal control and multisourcing success is stronger when 
conflict arbitration is strong. 
Methods 
Data 
In line with past IS outsourcing studies (e.g., Goo et al. 2009), we empirically tested our research model 
through a key informant survey (Pinsonneault and Kraemer 1993). The questionnaire, developed by three 
of the authors, was administered to organizations in the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the US, 
spanning a variety of industries. A UK-based market research firm was used to gain access to a panel of 
managers from these organizations. The original English version of the questionnaire was translated by the 
market research firm and checked by native speakers familiar with outsourcing. Responses were collected 
through telephone interviews and an online survey. 
The questionnaire was distributed among potential middle- and top-level informants who were familiar 
with multisourcing arrangements within their firms. To ensure the targeted individuals’ familiarity with 
multisourcing arrangements (thus qualifying them as “key informants”), the respondents needed to answer 
a set of screening questions and meet the following two criteria: (1) Working for an organization with an 
outsourcing arrangement(s) in place, where a task or project has been consciously divided and outsourced 
to different vendors; and (2) Being familiar with the management of such a multisourcing arrangement in 
their company. The respondents then had to select one particular multisourcing arrangement currently in 
place in their organization. Within this particular multisourcing arrangement, respondents were asked to 
select the two vendors contributing the most to the multisourcing arrangement (in terms of amount of 
work). The questions relevant to testing our model pertained only to this particular multisourcing arrange-
ment with the two chosen vendors, called vendor A and vendor B. Focusing on the two most important 
vendors, rather than on all vendors, allowed us to keep the size of the survey manageable and the survey 
identical for all arrangements. We worded the survey questions in such a way to make clear to respondents 
whether the multisourcing arrangement (level 2) was being referred to, or the relationship with individual 
vendors (level 1). Questions related to level 1 were asked twice, once with regard to vendor A and once with 
regard to vendor B.  
Before sending out the final questionnaire, the questionnaire items were pilot-tested with 15 international 
organizations, in order to ensure that all questionnaire items were understandable and could be answered 
by the intended group of respondents. Each block of questions was followed by an open field for comments, 
and the respondents pre-testing the survey were asked to note down any thoughts they had on the questions 
asked in the respective section. These comments were considered in the refinement of the questionnaire. 
In addition, we tested our model on the pilot data to assess the validity of the constructs. Items that loaded 
very low were removed from the questionnaire. 
The finalized questionnaire was sent out to 2,000 organizations. Overall, 200 usable questionnaires were 
returned after several follow-ups with the panel of managers. From these 200 cases, we excluded 10 cases 
after reviewing the descriptions of the outsourced tasks. We excluded cases when the sub-tasks assigned to 
different vendors were not interdependent (e.g., outsourcing IT procurement to vendor A and sales advice 
to vendor B), or when the outsourced tasks did not match our target services, which comprised IT services 
and IT-supported business processes. We also excluded one outlier, which reported a joint performance 
four standard deviations below the sample mean but above-average individual performance, suggesting an 
erroneous measurement. Our final sample size was n2=189 multisourcing arrangements, in which n1=378 
client-vendor dyads were embedded. Table 1 shows the sample characteristics. 
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics 
Characteristics of the Sample [Min; Max] Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Respondent working 
experience Number of years working in organization  [.5; 35] 8.6 (6.5) 
Age of multisourcing 
arrangement 
Years that have passed since the start of the multi-
sourcing arrangement [1; 9] 3.7 (2.4) 
 Number Percentage 
Client size 
1 to 250 employees 7 4% 
251 to 1,000 employees 63 33% 
1,001 to 5,000 employees 61 32% 
5,001 to 50,000 employees 46 24% 
More than 50,000 employees 12 6% 
Industry sector 
Financial services 34 18% 
Manufacturing 39 21% 
Retail, distribution and transport 25 13% 
Public sector 35 19% 
Other 56 30% 
Measures 
Each construct was measured based on multiple items. Where possible, we used existing measures that we 
adapted to the study context. All items were measured on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from “strongly 
disagree” (=1) to “strongly agree” (=5) with “neither agree nor disagree” (=3) as the mid-point. The items 
related to our focal constructs are shown in the Appendix. In line with the distinction between collective 
and bilateral formal control introduced by Bapna et al. (2010), we formulated the items related to collective 
formal control such that they gathered efforts toward specifying and monitoring procedures and outcomes 
that involved all vendors at the same time. Conversely, the items related to bilateral formal control focused 
on efforts that involved single vendors. To allow differential interpretation, we used highly similar items 
for both constructs, expecting the respondents to focus on all vendors versus one vendor at a time. Error! 
Reference source not found. shows how we operationalized our control variables. As indicated in the 
table, we transformed some of the variables to reduce skew.  
Table 2. Control Variables 
Country Single-item question on the client’s country (United Kingdom, France, Germany, It-
aly, Spain, USA); incorporated through five dichotomous dummy variables 
Sector Single-item question on the client’s sector (financial services, manufacturing, retail, 
public sector, other); incorporated through four dichotomous dummy variables 
Client size The client’s number of employees, as measured through a single-item question 
(transformation: natural logarithm) 
Concentration 
one vendor 
The fraction of the overall budget of the multisourcing arrangement that is allotted to 
this particular vendor, as measured through a single-item question (transformation: 
square root) 
Concentration 
two vendors 
The fraction of the overall budget of the multisourcing arrangement that is assigned 
to vendor A or B (transformation: square root) 
Relationship age Square root of the number of years since the start of the multisourcing arrangement, 
as measured through a single-item question 
Guardian 
vendor 
Where one of the vendors is responsible for managing all other vendors of the multi-
sourcing arrangement, as measured through a single-item question 
Architectural 
knowledge 
Measured with three items (CR = .81), focusing on the client’s knowledge of how the 
services provided by the vendors are related to each other (based on Henderson and 
Clark 1990; Takeishi 2002) 
Task interde-
pendence 
Measured with four items (CR = .77), focusing on the extent to which the tasks of 
vendor A and B are integrated, tightly coupled, and dependent on each other (based 
on Tiwana 2008) 
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Instrument Validation 
We validated our instrument through exploratory factor analysis in SPSS and through confirmatory factor 
analysis methods in AMOS. We used exploratory factor analysis to identify items that had low loadings on 
their focal construct, or high cross-loadings. We eliminated two items from bilateral formal control, one 
item from conflict arbitration, and one item from governance efficiency (see Appendix). Moreover, to enable 
differential analysis of bilateral and collective formal control, we eliminated two items from the collective 
formal control construct that were analogous to the items eliminated from the bilateral formal control con-
struct. We then conducted confirmatory factor analysis in AMOS to ascertain the convergent and discrimi-
nant validity of the resulting model. Error! Reference source not found. shows the results. Convergent 
validity is indicated by factor loadings, composite reliability, average variance extracted (AVE), and model 
fit (Straub et al. 2004). All factor loadings were above .6, with their average exceeding .7 for all constructs. 
Composite reliability was above the threshold of .7 for all constructs. AVE was above .5 for all constructs. 
Model fit indices were within recommended thresholds (MacKenzie et al. 2011) with an RMSEA of .06 (rec-
ommended threshold: .06), RMR of .04 (recommended threshold: .08), and CFI of .95 (recommended 
threshold: .95). Discriminant validity is indicated by model fit (Straub et al. 2004) and by comparing the 
square root of the AVE to construct correlation (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Construct correlations were 
below the AVE square roots for all construct pairs with the exception of collective formal control and bilat-
eral formal control, where the square roots of AVE (.72) and construct correlations (.73) were very close. A 
strong correlation between these two constructs was expected, given that they both measure amounts of 
formal governance and used nearly identical wordings. We therefore deemed these values tolerable. By and 
large, the evidence supports convergent and discriminant validity. 
 
Table 3. Validation Results and Construct Correlations 
 
Composite 
Reliability 
Average 
Variance 
Extracted BFC CFC CA IP JP GE 
Bilateral formal control .84 .52 .72      
Collective formal control .84 .52 .73 .72     
Conflict arbitration .85 .74 .49 .54 .86    
Individual performance .87 .68 .66 .50 .46 .83   
Joint performance .87 .53 .55 .67 .52 .71 .73  
Governance efficiency .83 .70 .25 .50 .47 .35 .60 .84 
Figures in the fourth column to the right show construct correlations, with the exception of the diagonal 
(see figures in italics), which shows square roots of AVE. 
 
Estimation Approach 
We used mixed models with random intercepts (Verbeke and Molenberghs 2009; West et al. 2007) in the 
models predicting individual performance, and OLS regression in the models predicting joint performance 
or governance efficiency. In the models predicting individual performance, the dependent variable is at 
level 1 (client-vendor dyad), while some predictors are at level 1 (e.g., bilateral control) and some at level 2 
(multisourcing arrangement, e.g., collective control). Such nested data structures violate the assumption of 
independent observations in ordinary least squares regression, AMOS, or PLS. Mixed models are able to 
cope with such multi-level data structures. Conversely, in our models predicting joint performance or gov-
ernance efficiency, the dependent variables are at level 2 (multisourcing arrangement). In these models, we 
aggregated level-1 predictors (e.g., individual governance) to level 2 by taking the average of both dyads. 
The resulting data structure is in line with the assumption of independent observations (i.e., independent 
multisourcing arrangements). We preferred OLS regression to PLS or AMOS in these models for two rea-
sons. First, OLS regression is more similar to mixed models than either PLS or AMOS. This eased the in-
terpretation of differences between models predicting individual performance and models predicting joint 
performance or governance efficiency. Second, OLS regression has greater power in the analysis of interac-
tion effects than PLS or AMOS (Goodhue et al. 2007). Given the important role of interaction effects in our 
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model, OLS regression was, therefore, an appropriate choice.  In all models we standardized continuous 
variables to ease interpretation and to avoid multicollinearity issues. 
Results 
Error! Reference source not found. shows descriptive statistics. Error! Reference source not 
found. contains bi-variate correlations. Error! Reference source not found. shows the regression re-
sults. Models 1a-1c include controls only, where model 1a predicts individual performance, model 1b joint 
performance, and model 1c governance efficiency. Models 2a-2c include controls and main effects. We refer 
to models 2a-2c in testing our main effect hypotheses H1, H2, and H4. Models 3a-3c include controls, main 
effects, and interaction effects. We rely on models 3a-3c in testing the interaction hypotheses H3 and H5.  
Error! Reference source not found. summarizes the results of hypotheses testing.  
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics  
n Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Devi-
ation 
Client size 378 250 3,000,000 27,494.00 218,613.32 
Concentration one vendor 378 1 90 26.61 18.67 
Concentration two vendors 378 3 100 53.21 3.76 
Guardian vendor 378 0 1 .70 .46 
Relationship age 378 1 9 3.66 2.39 
Architectural knowledge 378 1 5 4.08 .73 
Task interdependence 378 1 5 3.47 .94 
Bilateral formal control 378 1 5 4.01 .75 
Collective formal control 378 1 5 4.00 .73 
Conflict arbitration 378 1 5 3.67 1.06 
Individual performance 378 1 5 4.15 .77 
Joint performance 378 1.83 5 4.05 .68 
Governance efficiency 378 1 5 4.15 .80 
Descriptive statistics show values before transformation (e.g., before standardizing or before drawing 
square roots) 
 
H1 predicted a positive relationship of bilateral formal control and multisourcing success. As the results of 
models 2a-2c show, the relationship was strong, positive, and significant for individual performance (β=.38, 
p <.001, model 2a) and somewhat weaker but still positive and significant for joint performance (β=.17, 
p<.05, model 2b). It was negative and insignificant (β=-.14, p>.1, model 2c) for governance efficiency. Thus 
H1 is supported for individual and joint performance.  
H2 predicted a positive relationship of collective formal control and multisourcing success. The relationship 
was positive and significant for joint performance (β=.24, p< 01, model 2b) and for governance efficiency 
(β=30, p<.01, model 2c), while it was insignificant for individual performance (β=.06, p>.1, model 2a). 
Hence H2 is supported for joint performance and for governance efficiency. 
H3 predicted a negative interaction effect between bilateral and collective formal control. The results of 
models 3a-3c show that this hypothesis is not supported. The interaction effects were insignificant for all 
dependent variables (β=-.01 for individual performance in model 3a, β=-.11 for joint performance in model 
3b, and β=.11 for governance efficiency in model 3c). 
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Table 5. Regression Results 
 Models 1a-c: Controls only Models 2a-c: Controls and main ef-
fects 
Models 3a-c: Controls, main and in-
teraction effects 
Predictor / dependent Var. a: Ind.  Per. b: Jnt. Per. c: Gov. Eff. a: Ind.  Per. b: Jnt. Per. c: Gov. Eff. a: Ind.  Per. b: Jnt. Per. c: Gov. Eff. 
Intercept .26 (.25) .21 (.25) .46 (.27) .30 (.21) .18 (.23) .51 (.26) .27 (.21) .15 (.23) .36 (.26) 
Client size .03 (.06) -.08 (.07) -.01 (.07) .02 (.05) -.06 (.06) .00 (.07) .03 (.05) -.06 (.06) .03 (.07) 
Concentration one vendor .04 (.07) -.11 (.16) -.19 (.18) -.02 (.07) -.11 (.15) -.11 (.17) -.02 (.07) -.15 (.15) -.15 (.17) 
Concentration two vendors .01 (.08) .20 (.16) .32† (.18) .01 (.07) .16 (.15) .20 (.17) .01 (.07) .20 (.15) .25 (.17) 
Relationship age .14* (.06) .03 (.07) .02 (.07) .11* (.05) .01 (.06) .00 (.07) .10† (.05) .01 (.06) -.02 (.07) 
Guardian .13 (.13) -.21 (.14) -.09 (.15) .08 (.11) -.20 (.13) -.09 (.14) .05 (.11) -.16 (.13) -.04 (.14) 
Client’s architectural 
knowledge 
.42*** 
(.06) 
.52*** 
(.06) 
.35*** 
(.07) .13* (.06) 
.27*** 
(.07) .14† (.08) .11† (.06) 
.23** 
(.07) .12 (.08) 
Task interdependence .01 (.06) .02 (.07) -.04 (.07) -.05 (.05) -.06 (.06) -.05 (.07) -.05 (.05) -.06 (.06) -.07 (.07) 
Bilateral formal control - - - .38*** 
(.06) .17* (.08) -.14 (.09) 
.39*** 
(.06) 
.17** 
(.08) -.15 (.09) 
Collective formal control - - - 
.06 (.07) 
.24** 
(.09) 
.30** 
(.10) .10 (.07) 
.28** 
(.09) 
.38*** 
(.10) 
Conflict arbitration - - - .19** 
(.06) .13† (.07) 
.26** 
(.08) 
.18** 
(.06) .13† (.07) 
.26** 
(.08) 
Bilateral formal control × col-
lective formal control 
- - - 
- - - -.01 (.05) -.11 (.07) .11 (.08) 
Conflict arbitration × collec-
tive formal control 
- - - 
- - - .12* (.05) 
.19** 
(.06) .12 (.07) 
Random intercept variance .32 - - .19 - - .18 - - 
Sample size n1 = 378, 
n2 = 189 
n = 189 n = 189 n1 = 378, 
n2 = 189 
n = 189 n = 189 n1 = 378, 
n2 = 189 
n = 189 n = 189 
AIC 973.7 - - 907.9 - - 910.4 - - 
ΔF - 5.81*** 3.43** - 12.67*** 8.15*** - 4.12* 4.59* 
Adjusted R2 - .30 .18 - .42 .27 - .44 .30 
(† p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, standard errors in parentheses, dummy control variables for country and sector not shown) 
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Table 6. Summary of Hypotheses Testing Results 
Hypothesis / Dependent Variable Individual Per-
formance 
Joint Perfor-
mance 
Governance Effi-
ciency 
H1: Positive effect of bilateral formal control √ √  
H2: Positive effect of collective formal control  √ √ 
H3: Negative interaction effect of bilateral and 
collective formal control 
   
H4: Positive effect of conflict arbitration √ (√) √ 
H5: Positive interaction effect of collective for-
mal control and conflict arbitration 
√ √  
√: Support, (√): Marginal support 
 
H4 predicted positive associations of conflict arbitration with multisourcing success. The results of models 
2a-2c support this hypothesis, although with marginal significance in the model predicting joint perfor-
mance. Conflict arbitration had positive and significant relationships with individual performance (β=.19, 
p <.01. model 2a), joint performance (β=.13, p<.1, model 2b), and governance efficiency (β=26, p<.01, 
model 2c). 
H5 predicted positive interaction effects of collective formal control and conflict arbitration. Model 3a and 
3b show positive and significant interaction effects for individual performance (β=.12, p<.05) and joint per-
formance (β=.18, p<.01). Model 3c shows an insignificant coefficient predicting governance efficiency 
(β=.11, p>.1). Thus H5 is supported for individual performance and for joint performance. 
Discussion 
This research was motivated by the lack of studies examining how formal governance strategies specific to 
multisourcing (bilateral formal control, collective formal control, conflict arbitration between vendors) af-
fect success dimensions relevant for multisourcing (individual performance, joint performance, governance 
efficiency). In this section we summarize our findings on each success dimension (individual performance, 
joint performance, and governance efforts), before discussing implications and contributions from our 
study. 
Individual Performance 
Although a particular challenge in multisourcing is the coordination between vendors, clients may also 
strive to obtain high individual performance from each vendor (i.e., the services delivered individually by 
the vendor fully meet the client’s objectives). Our findings show that a key strategy for ensuring high indi-
vidual performance is bilateral formal control. In model 2a, bilateral formal control is the strongest predic-
tor of individual performance. It appears that the dyadic specification and monitoring of outcomes and 
procedures inherent to bilateral formal control is most likely to motivate vendors to deliver their individual 
contributions according to the client’s expectations, and deter them from opportunistic behavior. However, 
our results also indicate that clients seeking to obtain high individual performance should not limit their 
governance efforts to bilateral formal control. Conflict arbitration is also positively related to individual 
performance, as it deters vendors from ‘blame-game’ attitudes and encourages them to pursue a collabora-
tive approach. Moreover, if accompanied by conflict arbitration, collective formal control can also contrib-
ute to higher individual performance. Figure 3a illustrates the interaction between collective formal control 
and conflict arbitration (as per our findings in model 3a). As the interaction plot shows, under weak conflict 
arbitration (one standard deviation below the sample mean), collective formal control barely contributes to 
individual performance (see the line marked by squares). Conversely, under strong conflict arbitration (one 
standard deviation above the sample mean), collective formal control contributes substantially to higher 
individual performance, as indicated by the positive slope of the line marked by triangles. It seems that the 
overall goals and procedures specified through collective formal control can cascade down to the level of 
individual performance only if conflict arbitration provides the infrastructure through which vendors can 
break down overall goals and procedures to individual contributions and legitimately enforce these contri-
butions from the other vendors. 
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Figure 3a-b. Interaction Plots 
 
Importantly, our results suggest that clients do not have to choose between either collective or bilateral 
formal control. The insignificant interaction effect between bilateral and collective formal control (see 
model 2a) indicates that bilateral and collective formal control (the latter only if accompanied by conflict 
arbitration) contribute independently to high individual performance. Hence, clients who seek high indi-
vidual performance are best advised to rely on both bilateral and collective formal control, accompanied by 
conflict arbitration charters. 
Joint Performance 
Although clients may strive to ensure high individual performance from each vendor, a key challenge in 
multisourcing lies in achieving high joint performance, which implies that interdependencies are effectively 
addressed. The strongest predictor of joint performance in our model is collective formal control. Hence, 
collective formal control is a key strategy for achieving high joint performance. This may suggest that col-
lective control provides vendors with “the big picture” or the overall desired outcomes and procedures in 
the arrangement. This, we argue, helps vendors to pursue a collaborative mode to see how their individual 
contributions should integrate with the contributions of the other vendors. 
Although collective formal control is a key strategy for achieving high joint performance, it is not the sole 
strategy. Bilateral formal control contributes independently to joint performance, as indicated by the sig-
nificant main effect of bilateral formal control in model 2b, and by the insignificant interaction effect of 
bilateral and collective formal control in model 3b. Hence, clients do not face a choice in relying on either 
collective or bilateral formal control. They should rely on both if their goal is to achieve high joint perfor-
mance. Although conflict arbitration per se shows a rather weak effect on joint performance, it does 
strengthen the effect of collective formal control. This interaction is visualized in Figure 3b. The figure 
shows that without conflict arbitration, collective formal control helps slightly increase joint performance 
(see the relatively flat line marked by squares). Conversely if accompanied by conflict arbitration, collective 
formal control has a strong effect on joint performance (see the line marked by triangles). Simply put, it 
appears that without conflict arbitration, collective formal control is a blunt sword because vendors lack the 
legitimacy to enforce the individual contributions from other vendors.  
Governance Efficiency 
The preceding discussion suggests that clients are best to combine bilateral and collective formal control 
and conflict arbitration. However, such a governance strategy may be costly. Findings on our third depend-
ent variable, governance efficiency, provide some perspective on this trade-off. We find that collective for-
mal control and conflict arbitration are strongly positively related to governance efficiency, while bilateral 
formal control has a negative, although insignificant, relationship to governance efficiency. This finding 
shows that it is quite effortful for clients to set up and maintain tight control relationships with individual 
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vendors. In light of these costs, the most efficient governance approach is to combine collective formal con-
trol with conflict arbitration, which may allow a good portion of the coordination and conflict resolution 
efforts to be delegated to the vendors. While this approach is superior in terms of efficiency, it is unlikely to 
elicit very strong individual contributions (as discussed in our findings on individual performance). 
Implications and Contributions 
Our reseach makes important contributions to the IS outsourcing literature. As multisourcing has become 
a common sourcing model, understanding the governance mechanisms that lead to better performance is 
imperative for both client firms and their vendors. So far the limited extant literature has shed little light 
on what leads to successful multisourcing arrangements. As such, our paper unpacks the contribution of 
formal goverance, studied here as bilateral formal control, collective formal control and conflict arbitration, 
to multisourcing performance. In doing so, our paper strengthens and further develops several ideas laid 
out by Bapna et al. (2010). First, we show that the distinction between bilateral control and collective formal 
control is empirically valid. Second, in line with the emphasis on OLAs that specify collaboration principles 
(Oshri et al. 2015), our study sheds light on the role of conflict arbitration between vendors as another 
critical mechanism to improve performance. Third, we find empirical support for Bapna and colleagues’ 
idea that collective formal control and conflict arbitration act as complements to each other. 
Our paper also goes beyond ideas laid out by Bapna et al. (2010) and the multisourcing literature in two 
important regards. First, our paper is the first to provide empirical insights into the relationship between 
bilateral and collective formal control. Although we had expected a substitutional relationship, arguing that 
collective and bilateral formal control are functional equivalents and that one impairs the benefits of the 
other, we found no empirical support for this idea (see the insignificant interaction effects). Instead, our 
results suggest that the benefits from using the one are independent of the benefits from using the other. 
Thus, in contrast to our expectations, bilateral and collective formal control are not functional equivalents. 
They appear to serve different functions. It is possible that bilateral formal control serves primarily to dis-
courage opportunistic behavior from individual vendors, whereas collective formal control serves primarily 
to achieve coordination among vendors. Future research could test this assertion by measuring opportun-
istic behavior and coordination problems and by correlating these outcomes with bilateral and collective 
formal control. From a practical perspective, the lack of a substitional relationship suggests that clients do 
not face a choice between either bilateral or collective formal control. Since these two types of governance 
contribute independently to joint performance, clients may often be advised to rely on both bilateral and 
collective formal control. 
Second, our paper is the first to capture the notion of multisourcing success as a three-dimensional con-
struct, with individual performance, joint performance, and governance efficiency all relevant and impera-
tive for the multisourcing setting. We show that each of these performance dimensions is affected by formal 
governance strategies in different ways, implying that clients should choose their governance strategies 
based on the performance dimensions they value most. Clients striving for governance efficiency are ad-
vised to combine collective governance and conflict arbitration. Clients striving for a high-quality well co-
ordinated service (i.e., high joint performance) should combine bilateral and collective formal control and 
conflict arbitration. Finally, clients who value individual performance most (e.g., because interdependen-
cies between vendors are rather weak) should emphasize strong bilateral formal control, although some 
level of collective formal control paired with conflict arbitration may further increase individual perfor-
mance. 
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Appendix: Survey Instrument 
Collective Formal Control (based on Kirsch et al. 2002) 
To ensure that not the individual performance of vendor A and  B, but rather their combined performance 
(i.e., solutions by vendor A and B in combination as part of the multisourcing arrangement) meet our ob-
jectives, we … 
CFC1: … expect both vendors to follow an understandable written sequence of steps that define interactions 
between these two vendors.* 
CFC2: … assess the extent to which both vendors interact in accordance to existing written procedures and 
practices when delivering the outsourced service. 
CFC3: … evaluate the extent to which combined services are delivered as defined in the contract regardless 
of how this goal is accomplished. 
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CFC4: … test intermediary and/or final joint outcomes/deliverables against criteria defined in the contract, 
regardless of how this goal is achieved. 
CFC5: … have several sources of objective data we can rely on.* 
CFC6: … have defined quantifiable measures depicting the extent to which combined objectives are 
achieved. 
CFC7: … have defined accurate and reliable measures that indicate the extent to which the delivered services 
jointly meet our objectives. 
Bilateral Formal Control (based on Kirsch et al. 2002) 
To ensure that the vendor meets our expected service-level targets/quality  we … (separate columns to be 
answered for vendor A and vendor B) 
BFC1: … expect the vendor to follow an understandable written sequence of steps in delivering its services.* 
BFC2: … assess the extent to which the vendor is following existing written procedures and practices  when 
delivering the outsourced service. 
BFC3: … evaluate the extent to which services were delivered as defined in the contract regardless of how 
this goal was accomplished.  
BFC4: … test intermediary and/or final outcomes/deliverables against criteria defined in the contract, re-
gardless of how these outcomes were achieved. 
BFC5: … have several sources of objective data we can rely on.* 
BFC6: … have defined quantifiable measures in place. 
BFC7: …have defined accurate and reliable measures. 
Conflict Arbitration (based on Goo et al. 2009) 
When it comes to disagreement between vendors A and B … 
CA1: … we have procedures in place for how to resolve them. 
CA2: … we have process descriptions to determine how the parties should resolve the conflict. 
CA3: … there are operational level agreements between the vendors that determine how to resolve the con-
flict, without our involvement.* 
Individual Performance (based on Grover et al. 1996) 
How would you characterize your satisfaction with the performance of each vendor so far? (separate col-
umns to be answered for vendor A and vendor B) 
IP1: …the products/services delivered by the vendor meet our expectations. 
IP2: …we have met our goals with the vendor. 
IP3: …overall, we are satisfied with our relationship with the vendor. 
Governance Efficiency (based on Dibbern et al. 2012) 
With regard to vendor A and vendor B …  
GE1: … our overall cost and effort for managing the relationship with them is higher than expected.  
GE2: … we have met our goals with the vendor.* 
GE2: … our overall cost and effort for coordinating and monitoring them are within our expectations. 
GE3: … our overall cost and effort for guiding their performance and service delivery are within our expec-
tations. 
Joint Performance (based on Grover et al. 1996; Lee and Kim 1999; Tiwana 2008) 
With regard to the combined performance of vendor A and vendor B as part of the multisourcing arrange-
ment so far … 
JP1: … the products/services delivered meet our expectations. 
JP2: … we have met our goals. 
JP3: … we have completed key milestones in accordance with our objectives. 
JP4: … we have achieved our desired cost savings. 
JP5: … we are satisfied with our overall benefits from outsourcing. 
JP6: … we have so far met project/service requirements. 
(*Items with asterisk were removed during analysis) 
